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This article first explores property law '.s model for addressing split
ownership of land so that its relevance to real estate taxation can be
examined. It then discusses the public policies and pragmatic
concerns that influence the judicial definitions of "property" and
"value" in real estate taxation. Finally, four areas, of property law
are examined that raise questions of "property" and land "value"
that are analogous to those in real estate taxation. Each of these four
areas of property law teaches an important lesson about the
comparative meanings of "property" and "value."
"Value is a word of many meanings." Justice Louis D. Brandeis 1
State and local governments impose ad valorem taxes on real estate.2 These taxes provide the major source of revenue to these governmental entities.3
Real estate taxes are calculated by multiplying the legislatively
imposed tax rate by the value of the land as determined by a governmental assessing authority. 4 The valuation of the property is a critical part of the system. The collective valuations of properties in the
jurisdiction will determine the amount of revenue available to government for public activities. Moreover, important tax equity issues

* Everett D. and Eugenia S. McCurdy Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio. © Gerald Korngold 1996. All rights
reserved.
1 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 US 276, 310 (1923).
See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1766 ("But what is the
'value'?").
2 For an overview of real estate taxation, see P. Rohan, Real Estate Tax Appeals
§ 2.01 (1988).
3 See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
4

See P. Rohan, supra note 2, § 3.02.
7
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emerge, as each owner is concerned that the valuation of his or her
property compares favorably with those of neighboring properties. 5
Two issues complicate the valuation of real estate for tax purposes.
First, there is the fundamental question of what is the "property" that
is being taxed. Second, the method or methods for computing the
"value" of the property must be determined. 6 These questions become especially difficult when the property being valued is split
among several owners, such as property subject to a long-term lease
or land subject to an encumbrance (such as an easement or restrictive
covenant).
"General" property or real estate law- terms used here to encompass the areas of property law outside of real estate taxation-has
also wrestled with the definitions of "property" and "value." 7 For
centuries, judges, lawyers, and legal theoreticians have struggled to
answer the question "what is property?" 8 This leads to a fundamental
inquiry: do the concepts of "property" and "value" in general property law mesh with those same ideas in real estate taxation?
At first glance, it would seem to be a fairly easy task to define
"property" and to find the "value" of real estate for taxation purposes. After all, the market is constantly and efficiently setting prices
5

See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.

6

See J. Bon bright, Valuation of Property (1937) (the seminal work on the theory,
philosophy, and realities of valuation); See generally Levmore, "Self-Assessed
Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law," 68 Va. L. Rev. 771 (1982); Browning,
"Land Value Taxation: Promises and Problems," J. Am. Planning Ass'n 301 (Nov.
1963).
A statute might indicate the methods for assessment. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §
39-1-103(5)(a) (1994) (describing the cost approach, market or comparable sales
approach, and capitalization of income method). For more on these methods, see
Brooks & Schultz, "Market Theory: An Approach to Real Property Valuation for
State and Local Tax Purposes," 45 Tax Law. 339 (1992); C.F. Sirmans, Real Estate
Finance ch. 5 (2d ed. 1989). Other statutes might describe value more generally.
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 42-201(4) (1994) (market value is "that estimate of
value that is derived annually by the use of standard appraisal methods and techniques"); County of Maricopa v. Sperry Rand Corp., 112 Ariz. 579, 581, 544 P2d
1094, 1096 (1976) (approving the cost, comparable sales, and income capitalization methods).
7
Economists have also struggled with defining "value." See M. Dobb, Theories
of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith (1973).
8
See, e.g., Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," 57 Am. Econ. Rev.
347 (Pap. & Proc. 1967); Grey, "The Disintegration of Property," XII NOMOS
69-77 (1980); M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 31-62 (1977)
(illustrating the evolution of concept of property over time); S. Munzer, A Theory
of Property (1990); Reich, "The New Property," 73 Yale LJ 733 (1964); Rose,
"The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property," 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711 (1986).
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for various types of land. Moreover, it would also seem to a person
unfamiliar with this area that "property" is "property" and "value" is
"value," so that the determination of "property" and "value" for real
estate taxation purposes should be consistent with the meanings of
these terms in other legal contexts.
However, determining "property" and "value" for real estate taxation purposes is a difficult task, because of different variables and
calculation methods. Moreover, different public policies and practi- ·
cal concerns are at work in the real estate taxation area as compared
with other property law contexts. These differing policies and realities lead decision-makers to definitions of "property" and "value"
that vary depending on the context. This article argues that the benefit of context-based meanings of these terms must be weighed against
the systemic and social costs of clashing definitions. The advantages
of a comparative law approach to understanding·"property" and
"value" will be discussed.

The Bundle of Sticks Analogy
Defining "property" and "value" raises special problems in real
estate taxation when ownership of the land is split among two or
more persons, such as when the land is leased or subject to an encumbrance. To address similar issues of multiple ownership, general
property law has over many years used the metaphor that owning
"property" is like having a "bundle of sticks."9 Each stick represents
a right or privilege, and when all sticks are held together they comprise maximum ownership. The metaphor is helpful in that it underscores that some of the sticks may be transferred to another person,
thus splitting rights in the property among various people. Although
the "bundle of sticks" analogy has been described by one ostentatiously modern court as "hoary and simplistic," 10 it continues to be a
useful method to conceptualize ownership. For example, one court
recently employed this model to determine ownership of property
for the purpose of applying a drug forfeiture statute. 11
9 See, e.g., Bedortha v. Sunridge Land Co., Inc., 312 Or. 307, 822 P2d 694 ( 1991 );
Day v. Day, 896 SW2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App, 1995).
.
10 International Business Machines Corp. v. Comdisco, Inc., 602 A2d 74, 76 (Del.
Ch. 1991) (despite the court's criticism, it applied the bundle-of-sticks analogy to
leased equipment).
11 United States v. Ben-Hur, 20F3d 313 (7th Cir. 1994). See also City of Milwaukee v. Greenberg, 163 Wis. 2d 28,471 NW2d 33 (1991) (determining ownership
to allocate the liability of a vendor and purchaser of land for demolition of a deteriorated building).

10
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Moreover, property law has recognized that the concept of "property" entails more than a physical and tangible relationship between
the owner and the object. Rather, as one court stated:
In contemporary jurisprudence, "property" refers to both the actual physical
object and the various incorporeal ownership rights in the res [thingJ, such
as the rights to possess, to enjoy the income from, to alienate, or to recover
ownership from one who has improperly obtained title to the res. 12

Land, thus, is valuable not just for the right of physical possession by
the owner but for its income potential.
Some initial links to real estate taxation come to mind. The "bundle
of sticks" metaphor, for example, might suggest the separate identification, valuation, and perhaps the taxation of the various sticks. 13
Moreover, the view that ownership entails more than a right of physical
possession might explain the income method of real estate valuation.

Policies and Realities in Real Estate Taxation
Before concluding that general property law definitions of "property" and "value" should be applied in the area of real estate taxation,
the various public policies and realities that shape the meanings of
these terms in the taxation field must be examined. As will be shown,
these factors may cause unique or even idiosyncratic definitions.
Legislative and constitutional source. Real estate taxation is authorized by state legislation or a state constitutional provision. Typically, the rule is that the tax is to be assessed against the "fair market
value" of the property or some similar formulation. 14 There is usually little or no explanation in the statutory language as to what "property" means in that context or how "value" is set. 15
Courts defining "property" and "value," therefore, are not engaged
in common-law decision making where their views of precedent,
policies, and equity control. Rather, the courts must do statutory or
constitutional interpretation to give meaning to these terms. Tradi12
First Charter Corp. v. Fizgerald, 643 F2d 1011, 1014-1015 (4th Cir. 1981).
See also Petition of Boyertown, 77 Pa. Commw. 357, 466 A2d 239 (1983).
13
Consider, for example, the different jurisdictional views on whether land subject to a restriction should be valued for taxation purposes with or without the
restriction, with the majority of jurisdictions calculating the value of the fee subject to the easement. Youngman, "Defining and Valuing the Base of the Property
Tax," 58 Wash. L. Rev. 713, 775 (1983).
14
See Kittery Elec. Light Co. v. Assessors, 219 A2d 728 (Me. 1966) (equating
just value, market value, real value, true value).

15

See supra note 6, describing statutory definitions of terms.
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tional statutory interpretation requires the court to find the legislatures
meaning, in light of the goals underlying the text. 16
Revenue enhancement. Real estate taxation is the essential source
of funds for the activities of local governments. One court acknowledged this by noting the following: "real property ad valorem taxes
are inherently public in character: they are statutorily authorized taxes
raised to serve the needs of the community as a whole. 17 Such taxes.
"are intended to raise revenue to defray the general expenses of the
taxing entity." 18 Courts, therefore, might factor in the revenue goal in
determining the meanings of"property" and "value." More generous
definitions mean increased revenue.
Tax equity. The courts emphasize equality of treatment of taxpayers .19 This stems from general societal norms of fair and equal treat-

16
When looking for the intent of the legislature, traditionally courts loo~ to legislative history such as committee reports. In recent years, however, some have
argued for a return to the plain-meaning rule in lieu of looking at legislative history:

Contrary to the remarkable "legislative history first" method of statutory construction pursued in Gingles, however, I had thought it firmly established that
the "authoritative source" for legislative intent was the text of the statute passed
by both houses of Congress and presented to the President, not a series of partisan statements about purposes and objectives collected by Congressional staffers and packaged into a Committee Report.
Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). See generally
Eskridge, "The New Textualism," 37 UCLAL. Rev. 621 (1990); Breyer, "On the
Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes," 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992).
The legislation is, of course, subject to constitutional review. See, e.g., WV Grant
Evangelistic Ass'n v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 900 SW2d 789 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995) (striking down statutory provision requiring that owner must prepay taxes
as condition to bringing tax appeal).
17 County of Lenoir v. Moore, 114 NC App. 110, 116,441 SE2d 589,592 (1994).
18 Zelinger v. City and County of Denver, 724 P2d 1356, 1358 (Colo. 1986). See
P. Rohan, supra note 2, Section 3.02[1] (describing formulas for funding through
property tax).
19 In order to prevent discrimination between owners, many states that require
land assessment at its "full value" have imposed equalization boards to prevent
different assessments between districts. See Podell, Banfield, & Schuller, "Requirement for Equal Assessment of Real Estate: Myth or Reality," 205 NY LJ 48
(1991); Note, "Tax Assessments of Real Property: A Proposal for Legislative Reform," 68 Yale LJ 336, 339 (1958); see also U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Property Tax in a Changing Environment 236-242
(1972) (describing reforms to property tax administration); P. Rohan, supra note 2,
Section 3.04[1] (discussing policies underlying full valuation); MacDougall &
Jaffee, "Prospects for Assessment Reform: An Overview," in Property Tax Reform: The Role of the Property Tax in the Nation's Revenue System (Nat'! Assoc.
of Assessment Officers, 1973).

12
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ment, 20 but it is also rooted in the Equal Protection clause of the federal Constitution and similar state constitutional provisions. While
the equality goal in the real estate tax context does not require all
landowners to pay the same dollar amount of taxes, it requires uniform standards for all owners of the same type of property. 21
Moreover, courts do not want some landowners to avoid payment
at the expense of others. 22 This influences definitions of "property"
and "value." As one court observed:
[A]n underlying aim of valuation is to assure that, in providing for public
needs, the share reasonably to be borne by a particular property owner is
based on an equitable proportioning of the fair value of his property vis-avis the fair value of all other taxable properties in the same taxjurisdiction. 23

System concerns. In defining "property" and "value" for real estate taxation purposes, the courts must consider the effect that these
definitions will have on the property tax assessment and collection
apparatus, as well as on the taxpayers' relationship to the system.
Judicial declarations must be readily understandable and easily applied by the government officials administering the system. Vague
standards invite litigation and may lead to inefficiencies and added
expense to the system.
Judicial standards must also be predictable for taxpayers, so that
they can forecast their expenses. Moreover, if the rules are clear, taxpayers are more likely to feel confident that they are being treated
fairly and that other owners are not receiving inapropriate advantages. Clear standards also may reduce court challenges by owners.
Certainly they make it easier for judges and administrative adjudicators to decide the cases that are actually brought before them.

20
"Uniformity and equality ... is ... the just and ultimate purpose of the law."
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision of Tax Assessments, 284 US 23, 29
(1931).
21
See, e.g., Colo. Const. Art. X, sec. 8 ("all taxes shall be uniform upon each of
the various classes of real and personal property").
22
For cases discussing importance of proportional contributions, see City of
Jefferson v. Missouri Dep't of Nat. Resources, 863 SW2d 844 (Mo. 1993); City of
River Fall v. St. Bridget's Catholic Church of River Falls, 182 Wis. 2d 436, 513
NW2d 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
23
In re Merrick Holding Corp., 45 NY2d 538, 544, 382 NE2d 1341, 1344, 410
NYS2d 565,568 (1978). See Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc. v. Maricopa County,
162 Ariz. 281, 782 P2d 1174 ( 1989) (cautioning that courts should not extend tax
exemptions beyond constitutional text since that would shift tax burdens to other
taxpayers).
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One would also expect a significant degree of judicial deference
to particular determinations of "property" and "value" by taxing agencies and officials. Court typically defer to administrative agencies
because of their expertise in the particular matter and their direct
familiarity with the facts, as well as for judicial economy concerns.
Although there are jurisdictional differences in degree, 24 courts usu- ,
ally show deference to administrative valuations of land. 25
Complexity. For a population that is all too often uncomfortable
with numbers, there is a high "degree of difficulty" in tax evaluation
cases for the courts and the litigants. As one court noted, "mathematical calculations in appraisals, though made in the best of faith, can
lead to divergent results." 26 Another observed that "the word 'value'
almost always involves a conjecture, a guess, a prediction, a prophecy."27
This numerical complexity often leads to confusion and unclear,
or even bad, results. In one case, the dissenting judge chided his. colleagues for affirming a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals that set
a value for the property that differed from the four figures submitted
by the parties. The judge asserted that the Board "contrived a
Solomon-like solution. Rather than find the facts, [the Board] decided to split the difference. Regrettably, this [court's decision] is
also a Solomon-like result-neither reasonable nor lawful." 28
Other concerns. Finally, the property tax systems in various jurisdictions reflect other policies-for example, exemptions for nonprofit
24
Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 42-l 78(B) (1994) ("The valuation or classification
as approved by the appropriate state or county authority shall be presumed to be
correct and lawful"); Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 162
Ariz., 281, 285, 782 P2d 1174, 1178 (1989) (trial court may not make independent
evaluation of value until taxpayer presents evidence to rebut statutory presumption that valuation is correct); LaSalle Nat'! Bank v. County of C_ook, 57 Ill. _2d
318, 312 NE2d 252 (1974) (requiring a showing of willful or arb1~rary behavior
for court to impose its view over assessor); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. City of Newark,
10 NJ 99, 89 A2d 385 (1952) (presumption of validity unless overcome by substantial evidence); Sibley v. Town of Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 120 A2d 77
(1956) (requiring court to set valuation); NY Real Prop. Tax Law§ 702(1) (1995)
(allowing de novo review by the trial court).
25 For criticism of the quality of tax assessment, see D. Paul, The Politics of the
Property Tax 7-8 (1975). For an earlier, and critical, view of the tax assessment
process and standards, see Note, "Tax Assessments of Real Property: A Proposal
for Legislative Reform," 68 Yale LJ 336 (1958).
26 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. City of Newark, 10 NJ 99, 106, 89 A2d 385,388 (i952).

27

Andrews v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 135 F2d 314, 315 (1943).

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Mahoning County Bd. of Revision, 66 Ohio
St. 2d 398, 408, 422 NE2d 846, 852 ( 1981) (Lochner, J., dissenting) (valuation of
steel manufacturing facility closed due to loses), discussed in Brooks & Schultz,
supra note 6.
28
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organizations; favorable tax treatment for residents as opposed to
nonresidents; and tax relief concerns, whether general, or based on a
narrower classification (e.g., inability to pay), or in order to protect
certain land uses (e.g.,,agricultural land). 29

General Property Law
Do the concepts of "property" and "value" in real estate taxation
mesh with those of general property law? An examination of four
areas of property law teaches important lessons about the comparative meanings of these terms.

"Value" Does Not Mean "Value"-Eminent Domain
Awards
A strong line of cases in the eminent domain area provides a stark,
and ironic, example of how the meaning of "value" shifts depending
on the context. Although there are some exceptions, 30 courts generally refuse to admit valuations for real estate tax as evidence to establish the value of property taken by eminent domain. 31
Courts have offered various reasons for this reluctance: assessments based on an "actual" value standard are not relevant to find
29 See, e.g., Ark. Const., Art. 16, § 5(b) (exempting public property used for
public purposes); Warman v. Tracy, 648 NE2d 833 (Ohio 1995) (exemption for
charitable institution applies to house used as residence for nuns that is owned by
nonprofit hospital at which the nuns work). See Durchslag, "Property Tax Abatement for Low-Income Housing: An Idea Whose Time May Never Arrive," 30 Harv.
J. Legis. 367 ( 1993); Buchele, "Justifying Real Property Tax Exemptions in Kansas," 27 Washburn LJ 252 (1988); Myers, "The Legal Aspects of Agricultural
Districting," 2 Agricultural LJ 627 ( 1981); Pantaleoni, "New York's Real Property
Tax Exemption for Religious, Educational, and Charitable Institutions: A Critical
Examination," 44 Alb. L. Rev. 488 ( 1980); Morris, "Historic Preservation and the
Law: Appraisals of Realty for Taxation," 3 Pace L. Rev. 673 ( 1981 ).
3°For cases permitting the use of tax valuations, see New Castle County v. 16.89
Acres of Land, 404 A2d 135 (Del. 1979); Vine Street Corp. v. City of Council
Bluffs, 220 NW2d 860 (Iowa 1974); City of Muskegon v. Berglund Food Stores,
Inc., 50 Mich. App. 305, 213 NW2d 195 (1973); Ransey County v. Miller, 316
NW2d 917 (Minn. 1982). See also City ofBlue Springs v. Central Dev. Ass'n, 831
SW2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (permitting use of government tax form since
witness was asked about property's fair market value, not assessed value).
31 See, e.g., State v. Griffith, 292Ala. 123,290 So. 2d 162 (1974); Cook v. City
of Indianapolis, 559 NE2d 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Mettee v. Urban Renewal
Agency, 213 Kan. 787,518 P2d 555 (1974); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n
v. Koziatek, 639 SW2d 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Holman v. Papio-Missouri River
Natural Resources Dist., 246 Neb. 787, 795, 523 NW2d 510, 517 (1994). See P.
Rohan, supra note 2, Section 11.03[3]; Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain§ 22.1
(rev. 3rd ed. 1995).
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"market" value as required by eminent domain; 32 tax assessments
have historically been below the market value and so are not useful;33 different policies control, with equality, uniformity, and proportionality of assessments being the key in the tax area, while an
exact market value is needed in eminent domain to compensate an
owner for lost property; 34 the taxpayer does not have a voice in the ,
tax assessment process and fears of retaliation by assessors may limit
protest;35 the date of the tax valuation may make it irrelevant; 36 and
there may be hearsay problems.37
Some of these reasons are not compelling. It is not clear, for example, that there is a meaningful difference between the terms "actual value" and "market value."38 Moreover, with the shift to full..,value
assessment in land taxation, 39 undervaluation shoul~ not be as great
a problem. Timing issues can be addressed by limiting the vintage of
tax assessments that can be admitted, 40 and hearsay objection~ can
likely be overcome with the admissions doctrine. 41
Perhaps the greatest obstacle, however, to a unified concept of
value in tax assessments and eminent domain awards is the
landowner's temptation to manipulate the definition of "value" depending on the circumstances. As one court observed, "owners prefer low assessment rates for tax purposes and high evaluations for
condemnation purposes." 42 Thus, even though courts might feel that
32

See Vine St. Corp. v. City of Council Bluffs, 220 NW2d 860 (Iowa 1974)
(indicating that legislation changed inquiry in both areas to market value); Morley
v. Jackson Redev. Auth., 632 So. 2d 1284 (Miss. 1994) (method of valuation for ad
valorem taxes is different from fair market value inquiry in eminent domain).
33 See, e.g, Housing Auth. v. Republic Land & Inv. Co., 127 Ga. App. 84, 192
SE2d 530,531 (1972).
34 See Hetherington Letter Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 207_ NW2d 800 (Iowa
1973); Holman v. Papio-Missouri River Natural Resources Dist., 246 Neb. 787,
795, 523 NW2d 510,517 (1994).
35 See State v. Griffith, 292 Ala.123, 290 So. 2d 162 (1974).
36 See Stewart v. Town of Burlington, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 712, 319 NE2d 921
(1974).
37 See United States v. Anderson, 447 F2d 833 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 US
918 (1971); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 261 F2d 287 (4th Cir. 1958).
38 These terms do not have clear meanings in assessment statutes. Youngman,
supra note 13, at 721-725.
39 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
40 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 79, § 35 (1995) (valuation assessments within the
three years preceding the taking are admissible).
41 See, e.g., New Castle County v. 16.89 Acres of Land, 404 A2d 135 (Del. 1979).
42 City of Muskegon v. Berglund Food Stores, Inc., 50 Mich. App. 305, 213
NW2d 195, 198 (1973).
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the tax "value" is irrelevant to eminent domain, they also want to
prevent owners from manipulating the process by in effect keeping
two sets of books. Some courts, as a result, bar statements of the
owner in prior tax assessment disputes as affirmative proof of value
for eminent domain purposes; however, they permit the prior statements as admissions against interest for the purpose of impeaching
the owner's credibility as a witness in the eminent domain action. 43
One is left with an uneasy feeling that "value" is a slippery concept indeed. As one court observed:
A certain degree of cynicism is no doubt warranted by the very general
practice of landowners who have applied for [realty tax reductions] of putting
down estimates that vary widely from the claims that they make when the
property is about to be condemned. As these figures cannot be reconciled,
the conclusion is inescapable that one estimate or the other, and possibly
both, bear little relation to the true opinion of the owner, and his statement
that the estimate represents his opinion is false. 44

The eminent domain cases show, therefore, that "value" may not mean
the same in all situations, not only because of legitimate differences
in the policy contexts but also because of improper behavior.

The Importance of Context-Long-Term Leases
One example from property law presents a problem of defining
"property" and the "value" that is analogous to real estate taxation.
A landlord making a long-term lease seeks to provide for increases
in rent in future years to reflect appreciation in the value of the leased
premises as well as general inflationary rises. 45 There are various
methods used to accomplish this. 46 The preferred approach, how43 See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Hamilton, 342 So. 2d 8 (Ala. 1977); Morley v.
Jackson Redev. Auth., 632 So. 2d 1284 (Miss. 1994) (allowing tax assessor's prior
valuation to be used to impeach the government's appraiser in eminent domain
action); Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Republic Land & Inv. Co., 127 Ga. App. 84,
192 SE2d 530 (1972).
44 In re Lincoln Square Slum Clearance Project, 15 AD2d 153, 222 NYS2d 786,
795 (1961).
45

See N. Hecht, Long Term Lease Planning and Drafting (1974).
First, the lease may simply set a schedule of rents for the entire lease, including increases over time. The problem with this approach is that the parties can
make only a rough guess as to the future value of the premises and general economic conditions. Alternatively, the lease may provide for a readjustment of the
initial rent at set periods based on changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Technical problems result, however, if (as was done in the late 1970s) the Bureau
of Labor Statistics changes the method of calculation for the CPI. Moreover, a CPI
46
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ever, is to provide for a new valuation of the property at certain intervals and a recalculation of rent based on a set percentage of return on
the adjusted value of the property. 47 The difficulty with this technique, of course, is the determination of the "value" of the property.
More specifically, courts have faced the question of whether the value
of the land should be calculated as being encumbered by the lease
and use restrictions or based on the land's "highest and best use,"
free and clear of the lease and any use restrictions. The tenant generally prefers a calculation based on the presence of the lease and its
restrictions because that will lower the value of the property and the
new rent, while the landlord favors the "free and clear" valuation.
In some ways, this is similar to an issue in tax valuation where an
assessor must find the "value" of land subject to a "disadvantageous"
long-term lease (i.e., a lease with below-market terms, such as low
rent). Should "value" be determined based on the land being free of
the lease or encumbered by it?48 Most courts in the tax context find
value based on the unencumbered fee. 49
adjustment at best reflects general inflation in the economy, and it does not indicate the upward or downward changes in value of the specific property in question. On rent escalation in general, see M. Friedman, Friedman on Leases Section
5.4 (3d ed. 1990).
47
See, e.g., Loyalty Dev. Co. v. Wholesale Motors, Inc., 61 Haw. 483, 605 P2d
925 (1980) (new rent equals value of property multiplied by the interest rate of a
lender).
48
The issue of "value" in rent recalculation cases is also similar to, and in some
analytical ways even closer to, the effect of restrictive covenants on the value of
land being valued for tax purposes.
The long-term leases cases in the tax context involve leases with disadvantageous terms (i.e., submarket rent). If the leases were at market price, then the
value of the land would not be depressed by the lease since, under a capitalizationof-income approach, the property would be throwing the appropriate amount of
rent for such a property. It is only when the rent is below market ~nd that rent
amount is used with a capitalization-of-income approach that there ts a problem
with undervaluing the property.
Even in the cases (e.g., Plaza Hotel Assocs. v. Wellington Assocs., Inc., 55 Misc.
2d 483,285 NYS2d 941, aff'd, 28 AD2d 1209, 285 NYS2d 267, aff'd, 22 NY2d
846, 239 NE2d 736 (1968)) that presume that the lease and its restrictions should
be considered in calculating value for rent escalation purposes, the courts do not
consider the amount of rent required by the lease in setting value. Indeed, if they
did, there would be a circular result-that is, the amount of rent in the lease would
be used to calculate the value of the land using the income capitalization approach,
and then, on the basis of that value, the "new' rent would be set (which could turn
out to be exactly the same as the rent in the original lease, if the multiplier for the
amount of return was the same in the escalation clause as the return contemplated
in the original rent). See Hirt v. Hervey, 118 Ariz. App. 543, 578 P2d 624, n.1
(1978) ("Some judges have persuasively pointed out the circularity inherent in
attempting to establish rent based on rent already fixed."); Cotati Alliance for Better Hous. v. Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d 280, 287, 195 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 (1983)
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This treatment in the tax context can be compared to how the courts
define "value" for the purpose of rent escalation clauses. There is a
split among the c'ourts. Most prefer to calculate "value" free and clear
of the lease; 50 a few, however, find "value" based on the fee encumbered by the lease and its restrictions. 51
Does this mean that there is consistency, and that "value" in land
taxation means "value" in property? Unfortunately, it does not- the
("The process of making individual rent adjustments on the basis of a return on
value standard is meaningless because it is inevitably circular: value is determined
by rental income, the amount of which is in turn set according to value;" involving
calculations under a rent control ordinance).
Thus, the real issue in the rent escalation cases is the depression of the value of
the land due to the effect of the use restriction in the lease which limits the use of
the land below its "highest and best use" for the period of the lease. In this way, the
better analogy may be to use restrictions. Still, the use restriction can be viewed as
creating a "disadvantageous" long-term lease, which is precisely the valuation
issue in the tax cases.
49

See, e.g., Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 162 Ariz. 281,
782 P2d 1174 (1989) (noting that sometimes the presence of a lease makes the
property more valuable, so that valuation without the lease may benefit the taxpayer); Schultz v. TM Florida-Ohio Realty Ltd. Partnership, 577 So. 2d 573 (Fla.
1991) (requiring assessment against all interests in the land); Valencia Ctr., Inc. v.
Bystrom, 543 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1989); Swan Lake Moulding Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 257 Or. 622, 480 P2d 713 ( 1971) (basing value on potential not actual
income); Cherokee Water Co. v. Gregg County Appraisal Dist., 773 SW2d 949
(Tex. Ct. App. 1989). See Youngman, supra note 13 at 718-746 (showing that this
result is consistent with goals of the real estate tax system).
Other courts take a more flexible approach, not requiring that potential income
be used but instructing the assessor to consider both actual and potential rental.
See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 848 P2d
355 (Colo. 1993); Folsom v. County of Spokane, 106 Wash. 2d 760, 725 P2d 987
(1986). One court stated:
Placing a value on real property is not an exact science. When relying on the
income capitalization method to determine value, the factfinder necessarily has
some discretion to decide what weight will be given to actual rent, as opposed
to potential market rent, in reaching its decision. Where the lease was prudent
when entered into, the Commission is quite correct to consider actual rent as a
factor in determining the value of the property under the income capitalization
method.
Missouri Baptist Children's Home v. State Tax Comm'n, 867 SW2d 510, 513
(1993).
50 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Duckworth, 502 So. 2d 709 (Ala. 1987); Eltinge
& Graziado Dev. Co. v. Childs, 49 Cal. App. 3d 294, 122 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1975); cf.
Humphries Inv: Inc. v. Walsh, 202 Cal. App. 3d 766, 248 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1988)
(requiring value to be calculated subject to zoning restrictions). See M. Friedman,
supra note 46, at 800-803.
51 See, e.g., Plaza Hotel Assocs. v. WellingtonAssocs., Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 483, 285
NYS2d 941, aff'd, 28 AD2d 1209, 285 NYS2d 267, aff'd, 22 NY2d 846, 239
NE2d 736 (1968).
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similar results are coincidental rather than congruous. As will be
shown, there is no abstract meaning of "value" that compels the results in the rent escalation and tax cases; rather the correct meaning
depends on the particular context. 52 Moreover, if the courts paid better attention to the lease escalation situation they should conclude
that the minority rule-that is, calculating value with the encumbrance
in place-is the better meaning.
The tax cases that find "value" based on the land being free of the
lease are in harmony with the policies underlying real estate taxation.53 Taxing the owner for the full value of the property will maximize collections by the sovereign; equity among owners will _be
respected because an owner will not be allowed to escape his tax
burden and shift it to his neighbors by making an imprudent lease;
and the calculation of a hypothetical fair-market value of the property free of the lease, while not simple to do, may be less complicated and easier to administer than finding value and assessing tax
on separate interests.
When defining "value" in rent escalation provisions in leases, however, the tax policies-revenue enhancement, tax equity, and administrative concerns-are not relevant. Rather, there should be a different
agenda. Determining "value" for rent escalation should not be governed by per se rules of law; instead, the determination should be an
intent-based inquiry. In this commercial exchange, the expectations
of the parties-not an absolute rule of law-should control. The question should be whether the parties intended for valuation to be made
with the lease or without it.
As a result, the minority position in escalation cases appears correct; unless the lease provisions clearly indicate otherwise, courts
should not assume that the parties intended valuation free of the lease
and use restrictions that they were clearly agreeing to elsewhere in
the document. "Value" should be calculated based on the land encumbered by the lease. 54 As one minority rule court stated:
52 There is another difference as well. When a valuation for real estate taxation is
low, the taxpayer likely will not challenge it. Thus, litigated cases ~ostly involve
attempts to overturn the higher value of land set by the taxing authority. Since the
higher valuation of the taxing authority receives some degree of deference from
the courts, there is less attention paid to the arguments for lower value. In a displ,lte
between private parties over value, however, there is no bias for the higher value,
and thus the judicial determination of standards of value may be more evenhanded.
See supra note 24.
53 See text accompanying supra notes 15-29.
54 But see Bullock's, Inc. v. Security-First Nat') Bank, 160 Cal. App. 2d 277,
283, 325 P2d 185, 189 (1958) (adopting the contrary position: "if the parties had
intended anything other than market value, they would have said so expressly").
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There is no suggestion in the language ... that, in valuing the land, the
restrictions to hotel use imposed by the lease were to be disregarded and the
land valued as if it were vacant and available for the highest and best use ....
That valuations of land must take into consideration all encumbrances
thereon, including restrictions as to its use, unless there is a clear provision
to the contrary, is well settled. 55

Thus, it is the particular context that gives meaning to the term
"value." Reference to legal dictionaries for general definitions of value
and the use of meanings developed to solve different legal problems
is not satisfactory. 56 While that may yield consistent definitions, it
ignores the policies and expectations of the particular situation.

The Costs of Disharmony-Servitudes
The differing meanings of "property" and "value," although compelled by context, sometimes create confusion. The costs of disharmony should be considered by the courts when defining these terms.
A comparison of the concept of "property" in the law of servitudesthat is, the law of easements and covenants-and real estate tax illustrates the potential harms of diverging definitions. 57
Property law's bundle-of-sticks model is especially useful to explain allocation of ownership through servitudes. Adjacent owners
can agree to exchange a portion of their property rights. This could
take the form of an easement, granting an affirmative right over the
neighbor's land, such as a roadway; or it could be created as a restrictive covenant, giving the owner of the covenant the right to veto activities on the burdened land, such as a building and use restriction.
55 Plaza Hotel Assocs. v. Wellington Assocs., Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 483, 487, 285
NYS2d 941, 945, aff'd, 28 AD2d 1209, 285 NYS2d 267, aff'd, 22 NY2d 846,239
NE2d 736 (1968).
56 See, e.g., Bullock's, Inc. v. Security-First Nat'! Bank, 160 Cal. App. 2d 277,
325 P2d 185 (1958) (using dictionary and eminent domain cases; "the term cannot
be given a limited or special meaning, as distinguished from its usual definition").
57 The term "servitudes" reflects the recent drive for unification of the law of
easements and the law of covenants, with common rules to bind both interests
wherever possible. This unification is being effectuated in the current drafts of the
Restatement of Property (Third)-Servitudes. See French, "Servitudes Reform and
the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification," 73 Cornell L. Rev. 928 (1988). See also C. Berger, "Some Reflections on a
Unified Law of Servitudes," 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1323 (1982); L. Berger, "Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes," 43 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 337 (1986); Winokur, "Ancient Strands Rewoven, or Fashioned
Out of Whole Cloth? First Impressions of the Emerging Restatement of Servitudes," 27 Conn. L. Rev. 131 (1994).
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The benefits and burdens of these arrangements automatically transfer to the successor owners of the land. 58
The law has favored such consensual exchanges of property rights
for various reasons. 59 Servitudes encourage efficient allocation, allowing people to divide land interests as demanded in the market.
Servitudes also are enforced, like other contracts, because of the moral
obligation of the promiser. Additionally, servitudes permit parties free
choice-people can employ servitudes to create the living arrangements that they desire.
The law has recognized the economic reality that the presence of a
servitude usually increases the value of the benefitted land and decreases the value of the burdened property. 60 The court.s also quantify the "value" of a servitude, in various situations. 61 For example,
an owner of an easement is entitled to damages for permanent interference with her right. The value of the lost easement if found by
comparing the fair market value of the benefitted land with and without the interest. 62
58
See Korngold, "Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and Owners
Associations: For Reformation Not Termination," 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 513. For a
discussion of servitudes benefits, see Alexander, "Freedom, Coercion, and the Law
of Servitudes," 73 Cornell L. Rev. 883 (1988); Browder, "Running Covenants and
Public Policy," 77 Mich. L. Rev. 12 (1978); Ellickson, "Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls," 40 U. Chi. L. Rev.
681 (1973); Sterk, "Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of
Servitude Restrictions," 70 Iowa L. Rev. 615 ( 1985).
59
Korngold, "Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes and Owners Associations: For Reformation Not Termination," 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 513; Korngold,
"Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of In
Gross Real Covenants and Easements," 63 Tex. L. Rev. 433 (1984).
60
Reciprocal restrictions in a residential subdivision may increase the values of
all properties. See Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 NE2d 459 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1987) (recognizing that the value of the subdivision lots is increased by the
restrictions). Still, if one lot in a 1,000 lot subdivision were freed from the restrictions, it would likely have a premium value since it would have a monopoly on
providing commercial services in the area.
61
Value of a servitude is found by the courts on various occasions. When an
easement is taken by eminent domain, compensation is paid, with the easement
usually valued as the difference in the fair market value of the benefitted property
with and without the easement. G. Korngold, Private Land Use Arrangements:
Easements, Real Covenants, and Equitable Servitudes§ 6.14 (1990). When a ~estrictive covenant is taken by eminent domain, damages may be calculated in one
of two ways: the difference between the fair market value of the benefitted or
burdened property before and after the violation. Id., § 11.11. If a restrictive covenant is violated by the owner of the burdened land, damages are also calculated
as the difference in the fair market value of the benefitted property before and after
the breach. Id., § 10.11.
62
See, e.g., Crabbe v. Verve Assocs., 549 A2d 1045 (Vt. 1988) (roadway easement obstructed, resulting in decrease of market value of two benefitted lots in the
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Does this property-law analysis help in making a tax assessment
of land subject to a servitude?63 Most courts dealing with taxation of
land subject to a servitude adopt the "additive approach." They find
that since the value of the benefitted parcel is increased by the servitude, the burdened property should be assessed with the encumbrance
in place. 64 With the easement added to the assessment of the benefited lot and deducted from the burdened parcel, the courts maintain
that there will be neither double taxation nor revenue loss. This analysis parallels the bundle-of-sticks model of property law.
This analogy, however, may not be wholly appropriate for tax assessments. Some commentators reject the assumption that the increase
of value of the benefited land is equal to the decrease of value of the
burdened land. 65 Indeed, the additive approach may at times underestimate the total land value of the two parcels being taxed after the
servitude has been created, leaving some value untaxed. 66 The bundleamounts of $10,000 and $7,000 respectively); see Hall v. Robbins, 790 SW2d 417
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990); G. Korngold, supra note 61, § 4.17.
63 Youngman, supra note 13, at 774-811.
64 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Capital Mortgage & Title Co., 84 F. Supp.
788 (DDC 1949) (easement); Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc. v. Maricopa County,
162 Ariz. 281, 782 P2d 1174 (1989) (recreational use restriction); Liddell v. Mimosa Lakes Ass' n, 6 NJ Tax 417 ( 1984); Almogordo Improvement Co. v. Predergast,
43 NM 245, 91 P2d 428 (1939) (restrictive covenant); People ex rel. Poor v.
O'Donnel, 139 AD 83, 124 NYS 36, aff'd mem. sub nom. People ex rel. Poor v.
Wells, 200 NY 519, 93 NE 1129 (1910) (perhaps the initial declaration of the
rule). See Nichols, Real Property Taxation of Divided Interests in Land, 11 Kan.
L. Rev. 309, 320 n.94 (1963). See Menikoff, ''The Taxation of Restricted-Use Property: A Theoretical Framework," 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 41 (1978) (criticizing the
early New York cases).
65

Youngman, supra note 13, at 777.
1 J.C. Bonbright, The Valuation of Property 497 (1937) gives examples to criticize the additive approach:
An easement of passage over A's forest land to the road may greatly enhance
the value of B's hotel property without correspondingly depreciating A's land;
while on the other hand an easement of light over C's lot may merely make D's
backyard slightly pleasanter while preventing C from building an apartment
house.
The second of Bonbright's hypotheticals is questionable, however. Assuming
rational actors, rather than people acting for idiosyncratic reasons, it is hard to
understand how the situation of C and D continues. A rational C would not have
accepted the burden in the first place if it was against her economic interest; or if
this is a matter of changed circumstances, C would have brought the servitude
back from a rational D who would have accepted an amount more than the slight
benefit to him (and less than the gain that C would have by removing the servitude).
66 The concept supporting the additive theory-that is, that the value of the benefited lot is increased by the same amount as the value of the servient lot is de-
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of-sticks concept is thus an oversimplification in this situation-the
value of the stick to the benefited land is not necessarily the same as
the value of the loss of the stick to the burdened land.
Still, the bundle-of-sticks analogy of property law is important in
the taxation context for several reasons. First, it may be useful to
resolve the ongoing issue of valuing land in subdivisions that is restricted for recreational use for the benefit of surrounding homeowners.
One case, for example, held that there was no value whatsoever to a
golf course that was subject to use restrictions. The court would actually have done well to remember the bundle of sticks from firstyear property in law school. 67 The fact that some sticks have.been
transferred from the golf course bundle to the surroundir.g lots does
not mean that all sticks have been removed from the golf course. 68
creased (see People ex. rel. Poorv. Wells, 200 NE 519, 93 NE 1129 (1910))-may
actually undervalue the total property interests of the two owners. Under an economics principle known as "gains from trade" theory, the total value of the two
parcels of land typically increases when a servitude is place on one for the benefit
of the other, assuming that we are dealing with rational actors. Suppose that A
seeks a servitude (e.g., a right of way) over B's land. If B valued the burden on his
land at the same amount that A valued the benefit of that easement to A's land (e.g.,
$10), then the transaction would never take place-neither would want to go through
the bother (i.e., the transaction costs) to simply exchange $10 for $10. The transaction will occur only when A values the benefit of the easement at a higher amount
(e.g., $15) than B values the burden of the easement (e.g., $10); B will make the
deal at some amount between $10.01 and $14.99, with the exact amount depending on how they negotiate. In any case, A will be happy, having paid something
less than the $15 that the easement was worth to him, and B is also happy having
received compensation greater than the $10 worth of burden caused to him by the
easement.
Assuming both lots were worth $100 before the transaction, A's lot is now worth
$115 and B's lot is worth $90; the total land values have increased by $5 to $205.
If land is valued subject to the existing benefits and burdens, that would bring
additional revenue to the taxing entity and reflect the increased values brought by
servitude arrangements. Moreover, valuing land with the servitudes in place may
bring administrative benefits in that the assessor can look to actual comparable
sales, especially if this is a subdivision setting with other houses, rather than having to calculate value based on a hypothetically unrestricted land. Finally, as with
any change in method, if we were to suddenly switch to a system of assessing
property free and clear of restrictions, we would be redistributing wealth between
A and B because B would be paying higher taxes than he thought.
67 See, e.g., Twin Lakes Golf & Country Club v. King County, 87 Wash. 2d 1,
548 P2d 538 (1976) (holding that course subject to zoning and restrictive covenants had no fair market value); but see Sahalee Country Club, Inc. v. State Board
of Tax Appeals, 108 Wash. 2d 26, 735 P2d 1320 (1987) (finding residual value on
the burdened land). See generally Schultz, "The Real Property Taxation of Common Areas in Planned Unit Developments: Advocating the Rights of Homeowners
Associations," 1983 Utah L. Rev. 825.
66 See Lake County Bd. of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 91 Ill. App. 3d
117, 46 Ill. Dec. 451,414 NE2d 173 (1980) (although the property benefits others,
it still has some value).
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The remaining sticks have some value and should be valued and taxed
accordingly. 69 Poor application of the bundle-of-sticks analogy, not
the concept itself, is the problem in these cases.
Second, the recent steps toward unifying easements and covenants
into a single law of servitudes can be instructive in the real estate tax
area. 70 Whatever method of valuation is chosen-the "additive" approach or the "summation of interests" view or a hybrid-it should
be applied equally to easements and covenants. Both interests, after
all, are consensual transfers of nonpossessory property rights and
should be treated the same. Consider this example: under classic doctrine, a landowner could limit the height of buildings on his neighbor's
land either by purchasing an easement of view or by entering into a
height-restriction covenant. Although these have been viewed as different legal interests with different ramifications, they serve the identical function. It would be illogical to have different real estate tax
valuations based on a meaningless distinction between the legal form
that is used. 71 That would be especially ironic in the taxation area,
where substance, not form, is said to control.72
The intersection of servitudes law and real estate taxation teaches
an even more important lesson. In choosing the real estate taxation
definition of "property" and "value" for land burdened by a servitude, the law should avoid unnecessary adverse effects on the general law of servitudes. The law of servitudes has struggled mightily
to establish the appurtenance principle-the concept that the benefit
and burden of the servitude move automatically with the properties
to the next purchasers. The theoretical hurdle of binding a person
who did not specifically agree to a burden had to be overcome. 73
69 See Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc. v. Maricopa County 162 Ariz. 281, 782
P2d 1174 (1989) (although land was not marketable, it still had value to the owner
and should be taxed accordingly).
70

See supra note 57.

71

The value of a home is increased because it is located next to undeveloped
parkland even though the homeowner has no legal right to prevent development.
If the owner holds a servitude over the park, the value of the home should be
increased even more because the continuation of the park benefit is guaranteed for
the owner and for future buyers.
72
See Lock Lake Colony v. Town of Barnstead, 126 NH 136, 489 A2d 120 ( 1985)
(treating use restrictions in homeowners' association like easements).
The actual increase or decrease in value must be shown, however. See Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc. v. Maricopa County, 162 Ariz. 281, 782 P2d 1174
(1989) (no evidence presented to show that restriction of use of community facilities benefited lot owners; cost of dues could outweigh the benefits, depending on
the facts).
73

See Komgold, supra note 59, 63 Texas L. Rev. at 448.
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Moreover, the subtlety of the appurtenance rule had to be learned
not just by lawyers but by general citizens. The law assumes that
consumer buyers of homes in common-interest communities (whether
they are condominiums or subdivision developments) understand that
they are bound by the recorded scheme of servitudes and related rules
and regulations. Given that assumption, the purchasers are bound to
the scheme.
Courts, therefore, should be careful not to undermine the appurtenance principle by creating exceptions, such as "you will be bound
and benefited by matters of record except for real estate tax purposes,
where different rules might apply." Consumer buyers of housing,
unlike sophisticated ground lessors with experience and access to
counsel, may not appreciate such complexities.
There is an even larger societal concern. Every time lawyers and
judges say that "value" here does not mean "value" there, there is a
risk of fostering cynicism in the general public about the legal system. People might view this as legal chicanery and twisting of words,
a way for lawyers to maintain an unfair power over the legal system.
Therefore, the costs of clashing definitions of "property" and "value"
in different areas of the law must be balanced against the benefits of
varying the meanings of words to accommodate different contexts.

Lessons to Be Learned-Regulatory Takings
Despite differences that have been suggested, general property law
can still learn a great deal from real estate taxation about the meaning of "property" and "value." Consider the example of regulatory
takings.
During the past eight years, the courts-led by the U.S. Supreme
Court-have been increasingly willing to recognize that land use regulations may create a regulatory taking. 74 Moreover, the Supreme Court
held, for the first time, that monetary damages are available for such
a deprivation. 75
74

See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) ("rough proportion-_
ality" required between impact of the development and dedication of easement);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 US 825 (1987) (finding lack of nexus
between exaction and the harm government sought to prevent). See Michelman,
"Takings 1987," 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1600 (1988).
75
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 US 304 (1987). Where government withdraws the ordinance after a
taking is found, the land owner receives only interim damages (i.e., for the period
between the passage of the regulation and its withdrawal). Id. See Peterson, "Land
Use Regulatory Takings Revisited," 39 Hastings LJ 335 (1988).
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One of the key issues in these cases has been defining the quantum
of property rights that has been disturbed. The Court has indicated
that if the owner is denied an "economically viable" use of her land
because of regulation, then a taking may be found. 76 In Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission, 77 for example, the Court held that a
taking occurred, since the regulation barred any permanent structure
on the land. Additionally, several states as well as Congress have
considered enacting statutes requiring that compensation be paid if
land use regulation reduces the value of a property by a specified
percentage. 78
Thus, defining and finding the "value" of land is critical in the
new takings jurisprudence. The change in "value" of the land before
and after the land use regulation must be calculated precisely for two
purposes: to see whether too much value has been lost so that a taking will be found, and, if a taking is declared, to find the amount of
monetary damages due the owner. The courts have been wrestling
with the difficult issue of quantifying the amount of loss and damages.79 The large body of real estate taxation law defining and calculating value could be a helpful resource in this effort. 80

76
See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 US 470 (1987);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 US 104 (1987).
77

112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).

78

See Lund, Property Rights Legislation in the States: A Review (PERC Policy
Series, 1995); Jacobs & Ohm, "Statutory Takings Legislation: The National Context, the Wisconsin and Minnesota Proposals," 2 Wis. Envt. LJ 173 (1995).
79
See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 911 F2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 US 943 (1991); Wheeler
v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F2d 267 (11th Cir. 1987); Monroe County v.
Gonzales, 593 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
80 In calculating value for real estate taxation, the land must be assessed subject
to the burden of land use regulation. See, e.g., Security Management Corp. v.
Markham, 516 So. 2d 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Devoe v. Dept. of Revenue,
233 Mont. 190, 759 P2d 991 (1988).
Moreover, the recent regulatory takings debate has led courts and commentators
to reevaluate the nature of property itself and the extent to which property is free
from governmental interference. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has asserted
in dissent that if governmental action removes just one of the many sticks of the
ownership bundle, then government must pay for that particular stick. Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 517 (1987); see R. Epstein,
Takings 93-104 ( 1985). It is argued that the fact that the owner is left with 98
percent of his land's value does not mean that a taking did not occur as to the other
two percent. In dealing with these issues, we can learn from real estate taxation
law's flexible meaning of "property," and we can approach the issue creatively.
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Conclusion
The meanings of "property" and "value" in general property law
and real estate taxation diverge at times because of the flexibility of
language and differing policy goals. Care must be taken not to borrow definitions from inappropriate contexts. Yet, if a careful comparative law approach is used, property law and real estate taxation
can teach important lessons to each other about the meaning of "value"
and "property."

